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Sympathy　and　Communication　in　Hume
Naoki　Yajima
Int『oduction
［his　paper　attempts　to　read　Hume’s血eory　of　sympa血y麗aconsistent
development　of血e　theory　of　perception血Hume’s　Treatise．　i　Hume，s　theory
of　perceptions　enters　into　a　new　st4ge　with　his　discussion　of　the　passions　in
book　2．　This　development　signifies　something　crucial　much　beyond　a　mere
change　in　topic．　Prior　to　this　there　were　no　human　beings　apPearing　in
H111ne，s　epistemology；no　human　beings　with　emotion，　feeling　and　passion．
Abs血ct　ideas，　c耐om，　causa廿on，　the　ext㎝al　world　were　all　explained　only
血ough　the　association　of　perceptions．　After　discusshlg　the　topics　that　deal
witll　the　setting　in　which　lluman　activities　are　conducted，孕　theory　that
explains“blood　and　tears”human　beings　logically　fbllows．　Thus，　the
central　theme　of　book　2　of　the　Treatise　is　passion。　h　this　paper，1　argUe　that
Hume’s　theory　of　sympa血y　explains　the　perception　of　human　sentiments
which　enables　Communication　and　mora1　relationships．
There　sti11　seems　to　be　a　prejudice　prevail血g　among　Hume　readers　that
book　20f　the　Treatise　is　slightly　less　significallt　compared　to　the　otller
books，　but　this　pic応e　needs　to　be爬vised．　I　show　its　crucial　significance　to
his　entire　tlleory．　My　view　is　that　Hume’s　theory　of　passion　explains
sociability．　In　bo6k　l，Hume　deals　with　the　physical　percePtion　per　se，　but血
bo6k　2，　he　deals　with血e　s㏄ial　percep廿on　of　physical　ebjectS．　Hume　deals
with　the・　external　object　in　relation　to　our‘‘socia1，”as　opposed　to　physica1，
behaviour血at　is　based　on　the　pleasant　or　pa血fUI　impressions　of　th血gs．　This
at　the　same　time　means　that　human　relationships　in　general　are　compOSed　in
relation　to　the　recognition　of　tlle　social　value　of　thillgs，　which　leads　to　the
foun（lation　of　the　system　of　property．　Therefore，　Hume’s血eoly　of　passion
pr騨es血e　idea　ofjustice．1肛gue伽H㎜e’s　s抑pa血y　c励e　unde欝tood
as　an　extension　of　the　recognition　of　social　value　of　things．　The　primaly
㎞ction　of　sympa血y　is　nothing　other　than‘‘垂?窒モ?垂狽奄盾氏D”HUme’s　idea　of
sympathy　explains　the　perception　of　other　people’s　sentiments　in　like
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manner　to　how　we　perceive　the　social　value　of　objects．　It　creates　a　d巨rect
human　relationship血血e　form　of“co㎜罵血cation”血at　consists　in　sh曲g
the　same　sentimentS．　Communication　enables　human　beings　to　engage血co－
operative　action．　Hume’s　theory　of　passion，　therefore，　has　a　close　link　to　his
epistemology　and　moral　theory．　I　also　argue　that　Hume°s　theoly　of　sy坦pathy
has　a　role　to　play　in　providing　an　altemative　to　the　concept　of　providence．
1．The　signi血cance　of　Pride　and　Hunli監i¢y
Hume　regardS　passion　as　a　kind　of　perceptions．　Like　o血er　perceptions　in
genera1，　passion　is　not　any　hmate　quality，　and　is　produced　through　a　process
血就is丘eed丘om　immediate　reaction．　Be伽se　of面s　opemess　to血e　world，
passion　can　represent　an　individual　situation，　and　serve　as　the　basis　of　a
humall　relationship　which　is　the　central　theme　in　Hume’s　discussion　of
passions．　Hume　fbcuses　on　passion　in　order　to　deal　with　tlle　human
interactions　that　are　obviously　beyond　physical　contacts．　In　his　dealhlgs　with
passion，　he　denies　the　assumption　that　human　be血gs　are　independent　of
each　other．　Hume　sees　that　the　perception　of　the　self　is　created　out　of
interactions　of　passions，　in　other　words，　the　self　is　a　product　of　human
relatiollship．2　This　is　clearly　a　criticism　of　the　Hobbesian　method　of
introspection．　Hobbes　believes　that　only　when　one　reflects　upon　his　own
mind　can　one　know　what　others　think．　It　is伽e　that　human　beings　have
relationship　With　each　other　also　in　Hobbes；they　have　the　sent㎞ents　of　pity，
0r　benevolence．　But　all　of　those　sentiments　originate　in　a　unilateral
relationship　toward　others，　and　can　be　reducible　to　the　desire　of　self」
preservadon．3　Hobbes・writes，
GrieC　for血e　Cala血ty　of　another，　is　pity；and　arise血丘om血e　imagination
that　the　like　calamity　may　befall　himself　and　therefore　is　called　also
◎（rmpassion，　and　in　the　phrase　ofthis　present　t㎞e　a　fellow－fee1血g．4
　　Hobbesian　theory　implies　a　hedonistic　picture　of　human　motivation，
㏄cording　to　which　a皿human　actions　are　motivated　by　self－interest．　This　is
because　Hobbes騨s　tlleory　of　motivation　is　based　on　a　mechanical　theory
according　to　which　motion　is　determined　solely　by　the　cause　that
immediately　precedes　it．s　Hume　criticises　this皿derstanding　because　it　is
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based　on　an　ullwarranted　picture　that　human　perceptions　are　determined
directly　by血e㎞e磁ately　prec曲g　sensa廿ons．
Hume　finds　an　initial　clue　for　re舳g　Hobbesian血曲idualism　in　the
common　phenomena　of　human　llature　that　we　in　fact　feel‘‘垂窒奄р?@and
humility．”Pride　alld　humility　are　self－directed　sentiments　wllose
counterparts，　when　directed　to　others，　are　love　and　hatred．　He　indicates　that
there　is　an　enigma　about　feeling　pride　and　humility。6　Pride　and　humility，
though　they　are　opposite　sentiments，　have　tlle　same　obj　ect，　the　self。
However，　the　self　camiot　be　their　sole　cause　because　the　obj　ect　and　the　cause
of　pride　and　humility　are　different．　This　is　a　peculiar　po血t　that　is　not　seen血
the　perceptions　of　extemal　th血gs；extemal　things　are　at　once　the　o切ect　and
the　cause　of　perceptions．　The　cause　of　pride　must　be　something　that　causes
good　ef驚cts，　and血at　of　humility　must　be　something　that　causes　bad　effectS．
haddition，　the　cause　of　pride　and　humility　must　be　somethillg　that　is　close
to　the　object　of　pride，　because　unless　the　o切ect　is　closely　related　to　the　self，
it　cannot　cause　them；this　is　a　corollary　to　the　theory　of　causation　that
involves　constant　co可unction．　Hume　maintains，　therefbre，　that　there　must　be
“double　relations”of㎞pressions　Imd　ideas：betWeen　the　impressio血of　the
cause　and　the　self，　and　between　the　idea　of　the　cause　and　the　self　Hulne
explaills　the　double　relations　as　fbllows．
That　cause，　which　excites　the　passio軋　is　related　to血e　object，　which　na加爬
has　attributed　to　the　passion；the　sellsation，　which血e　cause　separately
pmduces，　is　related　to　the　sensation　of　passion：From血is　double　reladon　of
ideas　and㎞】鴻ssio軋the　passion　is　deriv’（L　Tbe　one　idea　is　easily◎onverted
into　dS・　cor・fedativer，　and　the　cme血繭㎝i煎）Wt　which　rescmbles　and
correSpondS　tO　it：With　how　much　greater　facility　must　this　transition　be
made，　where　these　movementS　mutua皿y　assist　each　other，　and　the　mind
receives　a　double　irnpUlse丘om　the　relations　both　of　itS　impressions　and
ideas（r　287）．
　　It　is　noteworthy　that　the　tmnsition　of　impressions　is　the　central　pri　lciple
in　Hume’s　theory　of　causation．　Hume　mentions　that　the　hypothesis　of　the
double　relation　can　be　compared　to　1血e血eoτy　of　causation（Cf　T　289）．　h
Humels　example，　someone’s　good　house　causes　a　pleasant　impression　to
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others．　The　vivacity　of　the　pleasant　impression　is　discharged　through　the
relation　of　ideas　between　the　ol）ject　and　the　self，　to　the　idea　of血le　self，　and
thus　prOduces　an　impression　of　pride．］㎞this　way，　one　fee蓋s　pride　in　oneself
in　pride　and　humility，　the　impressions　of　pleasant　obj　ect血t　mitially　belong
to　others　are　transferred　into　the　self　of　the　possessor　as　the　subjective
㎞pression　of　pride．　The　i　lpression　of　pride，㎞t㎜，　gives　rise　to　the　idea　of
the　se蓋f　as　the　obj　ect　of　pride　that　is血e　recognition　that　one　is　praisewonhy．
Regard血9血e　reladonship　betw㏄n　the　otj㏄t　and　the　subjecちimpressions
of　o句㏄ts　are　easily　transferred　to　1血e　impressions　of　the　self　Here　is　seen
an　interchangeability　of　the　loci　of　sentiments．　Phenomena　of　pride　and
humility　evidence　that　perception㏄curs　prior　to　the　idea　of　the　sel£
Feeling　pride　is　to　perceive　other　pθople層s　impression　as　one’s　o㎜．　To　be
proud　of　something　is　tO　feel　pleasant　impression　about　oneself　because　of
some　obj　ect　that　is　related　to　oneself　Unless　other　people　find　pleasant
㎞pressions　of　the　object，　one　cannot　feel　proud　about　it．　In　this　sense，　pride
is　a　social　prOduct．　ln　the　process，　mere　physical　o切㏄ts　are　trans｛bmled　into
social　value．　The　social　natUre　of　pride　and　humility　creates　a　paCtern　of
social　behaviour　regarding　the　possession　of　external　things；people
maturally　prefer　to　possess　those　th㎞gs　that　cause　pdde，　and　to　avoid　those
that　cause　humility．　Therefore，　this　eventually　leads　to血e　f（）undation　of　a
system　of　justice．7　The　mechanism　that　causes　pride　or　humility　can　be
apPlied　to　human　behaViours　that　cause　pleasant　or　painfU1　impressions　tO
o血er　people．　Those　behaviours　that　cause　pleasant　effectS　produce　plide，
and　those　that　cause　pah1血1　effects　produce　humility．　Therefbre，　human
behaviours　call　be　socially　evaluated　in　accordance　with　their　effects　on
other　people．8111　this　way，　morality　fbllows　the　same　mechanism　as　the
evaluation　that　a　possession　of　external　objectS　have　upOn　human　beings．
2．Explanation　and　J囎tificatien　Gf　Sympathy
　　After　discuss血g　pride　and　llumility，　Hume　deals　with“the　love　of　fame”
in　s㏄tion　l　l　of　the　Treatise．　This　topic　is　a　variation　of　the　time。honoured
topic　of　reputation　of　Locke’s　E∬の2．g　The　concept　of　symPathy　ap】pears　fbr
the　first　time　in　the　section　which　can　be　rightly　regarded　as　an　application
of血e　principle　of　p曲and　humility．　Some　commentators　suspect　that
Hume　does　not　give　a　defnition　of　syrrrpathy　despite　the　fact　that　he　attaches
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great　importance　to　the　concept．10　However，　it　seems　to　be　Humels　strategy
to　explore　sympathy　in　the　general　fbnction　of　passions．　ln　other　wordS，　fbr
Hume，　it　is　necessary　to　think　of　sympathy　in　reference　to　the　human
experiences　of　the　transference　of　passions．
　　The　basic血mction　of　Humean　sy卑pathy　is　alleged　to　convert　ideas血to
㎞pressions．1且This　fimction　cannot　be　ignored　because　Hume　does　not　think
that　sen血1ent　leaps丘om　mind　to　mind．　However，　in　order　to　have　a　more
comprehensive　understanding　of　sympathy，　it　is　necessary　to　clarify　the
conditions　that　produce　symPathy　as　well　as　itS　practical　implications．　Hume
thinks　that　fUnction　of　symPathy　is　to　receive　the　sentimentS　of　others．
No’　quality　of　human　mind　is　more　remarkable，　bo出血i飴elf皿d　in　i的
consequences，　thari　that　prz　peensity　we　have　to…脚pathize　wi血others，　and
tO　receive　by　commu血c甜on血eir　inclinations　and　se血entS，　however
different　fU）叫or　even　contrary　tO　cmr　own（T　316）．
　　It　is　crucial　to　understand　that　passions　are　a　peculiar　object　of　perception
in　that　they　have　completely　different　qua豆ities　in　accordance　to　the
perspective　of　the　observeL　The　same　passion　has　a　completely　dif〔brellt
quality　between　the　person　who　causes　it　and　one　who　merely　observes　it．
For　example　when　we　witness　the　misfb血ne　of　other　people，　we　are
capable　of　having　pain血l　moral　sentiments，　of　which　we　have　no　direct
experiellce　of　the　cause．　There　must　be　some　mecha血ism　that　makes　this
possible．　Hume’s　concept　of　sympathy　should　first　of　all　be　regarded　as
attempt　to　identifンthis　mechanism；fbr　an　individual　to　understand　the
sentiment　of　others，　that　person　has　to　have　the　capacity　to　feel　othergs
sentiments　as　his　own　ill　some　way　or　other．　However，　it　has　to　be　f㎞11er
clarified　what　it　means　that　to　have　the　same　sentiments　with　others．
SentimentS　themselves　are　not　the　entity　that　can　be　identifiable　in　temis　of
s賃㎝帥or　q鵬li妙．　It　is　well㎞o隅m血at　Hume　makeS　no　di脆rence　betWeen
impressions　and　ideas　except　in　relation　to　the　fbrce　or　liveliness．　Hume
says，
The　idea　of　ourselves　is　always　intimately　present　to　us，　and　oonveys　a
s㎝sible　deg顧ee　of　vivacity　to血e　idea　of　any　other　su切㏄t　to　which　we　a箪e
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relateCしTh直s　lively　idea　chmges　by（騨血to　a　Ieal　impression；血ese　two
㎞｛㎏of　I㎜⑳n㎞9㎞a卿mea㎝re血e㎜e，　and　diffeting　only血
th血degree　of㎞and　vNacity（T　354）．
　　It　is　impo血mt　to　note　that　the　eqUivalence　of　ideas　and　impressions　means
that　there　is　no　difference　in．　terms　of　their　cognitive　contents．12　The
di丘brence　that　sy1npathy　brings　to　ideas　is　not　mere　increase　of　strength；it　is
the　change　of　attac㎞1ent　of　the　ideas．　Befbre　the　woddng　of　sy坦pathy，
sentimentS　of　others　are　known　only　as　ideas　that　belong　to　other　people．　But
after　the　working　of　sympathy，　the　same　ideas　become　impressions　that
belong　to　the　self　because　olle’s　present　sentiments　are　always　impressions．
Therefbre，　sympatlly　is　a　means　to　share　a　similar　attitude　toward　the
situation　of　others．13　Tllrough　sympathy，　people　are　motivated　to　act　as
though　they　are　the　person　facing　the　sitUation　in　the　ma【mer　that　is　peculiar
to止e㎞t　I箆旭on．　What　actually　takes　place　in　symPa血y　is　not　so㎜c舳e
mere　increase　of　vivacities　as　this　change　of　vectors　of　the　selltiments．
Therefbre，　it　is　possible　to　regard　sy卑pathy　as　a　mecllanism　that　makes
people　adopt　the　perception　without　taking　into　account　the　difference
between　the　self　and　the　other．14
　　Hume　is　conscious　that　he　has　no　fewer　rivals　in』his　theory　of　syn卑pa血y
血an　in　o血er　topics．：5　There　are　arnple　evidences　in　the　Treanise　that　Hume　is
very　aware　of　the　criticism　that　his　theoly　of　sy叫pathy　call　contradict　our
common　experiences．　In　the鰍place，　it　is　necessary　to　remember　that
Hlme　notes　p曲and　humility　because血ey　are　common　phenomena．　He
takes　it　f（）r　9ranted　that　sy卑Pathy　‘‘is　not　only　conspicuous　in　children＿but
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　つウalso　in　me血of　the　greatest　judgement　and　understanding（T　316）．　He　even
insists　that　opinions　as　well　as　sentiments　are　shared　among　people　by
sy即athy．
　　Hume　supplies　a　very　elaborate　explanation　why　the　f海ct　that　we　do　not
always　feel　as　other　people　does　not　contradict　his　basic　theory．　Most
briefly，　Hume　ascribes　the　dys負1nction　of　syn箕pathy　to　the　insu伍ciency　of
the　double　relation　of　impressions　and　ideas（Cf．　T　290－294）．　If　tlle
hlsufほcient　double　relation　causes　the　dysfUnction，　it　proves　that　the　do面le
relation　is　an　essential　colldition　of　sy卑pathy　as　claimed　by　Hume．　Hume
also　admits　a　contrary　fbrce　to　sympathy，　called‘‘the　principle　of
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comparison（T　372f）”that　works　to　prevent　the　working　of　sympathy．　The
principle　of　malice　and　envy　explains　our　tendency　to　e可oy　the　misely，　and
to　hate　the　happiness　of　others．　By　this　principle，　Hume　provides　his
alte甑ive　to血e　Hobbesia紬esis血at　human　beings　are　na加mlly　sel舳．
According　to　Hume，　malice　and　envy　are　not　the　same　as　selfis㎞ess，
because　they　are　not　natura1．　They　are　compatible　with　the　working　of
sympathy．　In　order　to　envy　other　people’s　happiness，　we　need　to　feel　the
pleasure　of　others　by　sy卑pathy，　even　if　it　results　in　the　sentiment　of　malice
by　comparison　with　the　less　g【atifシ血g　situation　of　oneself　Therefbre，　these
co㎜ter－examples　in　our　daily　experience　Support　the　validity　of　Hume，s
theo『y　of　sympathy．
　　Hobbes　asserts　that　sympathy　is　reduced　to　the　sentiment　of　self≒10ve．　He
claims　that　sympathy　occurs　ftOm　imaging　that　the　same　thing　happens　to
ourselves；there　is　no　sympathy　that　sllares　another　person’s　hapPiness
without　refbrence　to　self」interest．　He　sees　sympathy　as　in　fact　a　form　of　selfL
love；deriving　pleasure　from　the　happiness　of　others，　which　is　originally　the
Epicurean　point　of　view．16　This　opposition　reveals　an　impor暇mt　point　that
unless　one　acts　with　Ilo　regard　fbr　one’s　self－interest，　it　cannot　be　properly
regarded　as　the　working　of　sympathy．　In　other　words，　the　working　of
syn享pathy　is　equivalent　to　the　denial　of　egoistic－individualism．　This　also
leads　tO　a　fUndamenta1　problem．whether　the　good　is　pleasant　and　naturally
done　on　its　own，　apart丘om　selfLinterests．　Hume　criticises　the　egoist－
interPretation　of　symPathy　in　the　Enguかies塵7　as　fbllows．
Now　as　these　advantages　are　e可oyed　by　the　person　possessed　of　the
character，　it　can　never　be　self－love　which　renders　the　pms岡of　them
a騨ble　to　us，　the職rs，　and　pro1叩ts（肛estx　eni　and　apProbation．　N6
fb1℃e　of血騨on　can　oollvert　us血むD　another　perso軋and　make　us　fanCy，
that　we，　being　that　person，　reap　benefit　from　those　valuable　qUalities，　which
belong　to　him，αif　it磁no　cele聯f㎞幽㎝ooUd㎞紬麟
transpOrt　us　back　intD　ourselves，　and　make　us　love　and　est㏄em　the　Pe【s叫as
different　frac｝m　us（E　234）．
㎞sho質，　Hume　denies　the　pOssibility　of　egoistic一血dividualism　be伽se　it
is　incompatible　With出e　natUre　of　imagination　to　reduce　other　love　to　selfL
40
love．18　Furthennore，　this　hypothesis　cannot　expla血the　symPathy　of　pah血1
sentmentS；based　on　the　egoistic　pictUre　of　human　be血gs，　it　cannot　hapPen
that　one　feels　pain　in　order　to　make　oneself　pain血1．　Adam　Smith　allies　with
Hume　in　re血1sing　to　ascribe　self」love　to　the　sent㎞㎝ts　of　sympathy．　Smith
says，
Sympa重hy，　however，　cannot，　in　any　sense，　be　regarded　as　a　selfish
P血ciple＿this　imaginary　change　is　not　s鷲pposed　to】bappen　to　me　in　my
owll　persoll　alld　character，　but　in　that　of　tlle　person　witll　whom　I
sy1rrpathiZe＿Ioonsider　what　I　shoUld　su［ffer　if　I　were　you，　and　I　not　only
change　circumstances　wi血you，　but　1　change　persons　and　characters．　My
gheC　theIefore，　is　entirely　irPon　your　a㏄counち　and　not　in血e　least　mpon　my
own．　It　is　noちthcrefore，血the　least　selfiSh．　A　mm　may　sympathize　with　a
woman血cl血d一鳳though　it　is㎞騨ible止at　he曲ould◎onceive　himself
as　suH翻皿9　hcr　pains　in　his　own　IP口per　person　and　character（T】Ms　p．317）。19
　　Obviously，　it　is　absurd　to　reduce血e　pleasure　and　pai血of　other　peoPle　to
self－interest．20　However，　the　theoretical㎞ework　of　self」interest　theory　is
by　no　means　absuld．　Tke　Hobbesian　explanation　is　not　illogical　but　only　a
due　consequence　of　a　strict　individualist　framework．］㎞order　to　re血te　the
血dividualist　explanation，　it　is　necessa【y　to　provide　a　theory　fbr　individuals
to　obtain　non。individual　sentiments．　Hobbes’s　strict　llominalist　positioll
prevents　h㎞仕om　giving　non－individua1　perspective．21　This　is　exactly　what
Hume　tries　to　indicate　by　his　theory　of血direct　passions．　Hume’s　theory　of
perceptions　tllat　comes　prior　to　his　concept　of　individuals　is　capable　of
identifying　the　fbundation　tllat　is　common　among　different　individuals．
Hence，　with　the　theory　of　sympathy，　Hume　breaks　the　individualist
丘amewofk　of　society　with　its　implication　of　the　social　contract　theoly．22
　　Tllere　is　another　objection　to　the　Humean　concept　of　sympathy．
Accord㎞g　to　this　ohlection，　even　if　symPathy　does　exist，　it　is　not　of　any
contagious　natUre　as　Hume　mainti血s，　but　stems仕om血e　mtio蛸udgement
of　the　individuals．　This　is　a　Smithian　criticism　to　Hume．　More
fmdamentally，　this　criticism　is　concemed　with　the　relationship　between
sentimentS　and　reason．　To倣e血e　conclusion㎞t，　Hume　considers　this　a
oon血sion　of　the　explanation　and　justification　of　sy卑pathy．　The　point　is　that
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symPathy　is　a　percePtion　and　not　a　result　of　rational　judgement．　Perception
is㎞伽entally　imposed　on　humari　beings：we　do　not　have　a　free　control
over　our　perceptiolls．　If，　fbr　example，　a　person　perceives　merely　some
percussion　of　sounds，　when　hearing　some　other　person‘‘crying，’out　of
distress，　it　does　not　mean　that　the　person　perceives　the　senthnents　of　the
other　person　properly．　It　is　possible　that　we　judge　the　clying　is　not　a　proper
reaction　to　the　situation．　Thus，　the　judgement，　although　impossible　without
the　perception，　is　different丘om　the　perception　to　the　situation．　Humees
sympathy　is　concerned　with　original　perception　as　material　for　judgement．
　　The　Humean‘‘general　point　of　view”represents　the　situation　in　tllis
proper　manner．　Therefbre，　sympathy　implies　the　general　point　of　view．
Without　sympathy　based　on　the　general　point　of　view，　we　have　only　our
in血vid皿1　view，皿d　cI㎜ot　behave“humanly．”23　J聡t　as血ose　who　do　not
feel　hot　by　fire　never　fails　to　misconduct　with　fire，　those　who　cannot
understand－amother　person’s琵eling　via　s抑padly　cIm　never　co㎜㎜icate
with　others．　To　obtain　a　proper　perception　is　to　make　common　kind　of
reaction．　We　Wil1　not　be　able　to　deal　With　frre　properly　unless　we　feel　hot　by
it．　In　the　same　mamer，　if　we　do　not　feel　sad　by　seeing　people’s　distress，　we
do　not　deal　with　the　situation　morally．241n　this　way，　hume　conceives
moralit　1　in　t　le　sirnilar　manner　as　causal　reaction．
　　As　a　pleasant，　agreeable　or　usef睡l　object　causes　in　us　a　pleasant
perception，　so　we　feel　pleasure　by　perceiVing　hapPy　face，　and　feel　pain，　by
perceiving　sad　face．　This　idea　is　expanded　to　Hume’s　basic　tenet　that
‘‘ﾊlity　pleases”in　his　moral　theory．”　To　approve　somet1血g　means　that　we
try　tO　advance　it，　and　to　disapprove　something　means　that　we　try　to　avoid　it．
］㎞this　way，　sy皿Ψa重hy　is　closely　connected　tO　o血e卜regarding　behaviour．　hl
other　words，　to　have　sy卑patlly　means　to　act　in　the　place　of　the　person　with
whom　we　are　sympathizing．　Therefbre，　moral　behaviour　is　to　take　the
sentilnents　of　other　people　through　sy1npathy　as　th6　motivation　of　one’s　own
behaviour．
　　There　seems　to　be　allother　problem　in　accepting　Hume’s　theory．　It　is
certain　that　tllere　are　cases　in　which　we　should　ngt　feel　sympathy．　For
example，　we　should　not　sympathize　with　a　gratified　thief　Because　we
understand　that　not　all　of　our　sy卑pathy　may　be　appropriate，　we　soek　for　a
standard　of　justification　of　our　sentiments．　Hume’s　theory　of　sympathy
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㎞plies血e　denial　of　human　rationality　because血e　mech曲m　of　s卿紬y
is　com血om舳ani㎜ls．as　This　is　why　Hume　elaborates　at　length　to　explain
the　exceptions　to　his　theory．
In　H㎜e響s　theory　of　sympathy，血ere　is　no　worry血at　we　are血evi励ly
controlled　by　wrong　or　illappropriate　sentiments．　It　is　not　because　the　wrong
sent㎞ents　are　not　infectious，　nor　because　we　ca血avoid　being血fected　by
wrong　sentiments，　but　because　other　’sentiments　are　infectious　as　well．　The
wrong　or　right　of　sentiment　is　not　determined，　when　a　sentiment　is
considered　singul副y．　It　is　realised　only　by　mderstanding　the飴ct　that　if
some　sentiments　are　inapPropriate，　other　sentiments　will　emerge　to　take
counter　e丘bcts．　This　is　possible　because　symPathy　is　not　restricted　to　present
or　immediate　sentiments　of　a　closed　circle．　Thou帥there　is　no　miversal
sy卑pathy，　we　can　in　principle　share　sentiments　of　all　those　concemed　with　it
in　the　end．
　　“Wrong　sentiments”can　be　understood　as　lacking　generality．　Wrong
sentiments　are　disapproved　by　most　members　of　the　society，　and　are
corrected　through　their　massive　oppOsing　influences，　which　also　presuppose
血e　workmg　of　sympathy．　For　example，　s卿a血y　wi舳e餌ti行c飢ion　of　a
successfUI　thief　is　more　than　nullified　by　sympathy　with　the　repugnallt
sent㎞entS　of　his　Victims，　and　by　sy卑pathy　with　ordinaly　people　wllo　accept
the　moral　noml　that　pmhibits　stealing．　Thus，　the　norm　is　derived丘om　the
sentments　o紬e　general　pOpulace．　Hume　denies　any　other　s伽（㎞d　against
which　the　・mora1　value　of　a　sentment　is　determined．27　hl　this　way，　s）卿a血y
can　bring　sent㎞ents　of　the　overall　effbcts　of　the　sitUation　to　a　‘‘judicious
observer．，，　Hume　says，
ln　cnder　tO　cause　a　transition　ofpassi（ms，血ec　is　recluir’d　a　doUble　re】㎞on　of
impressions　a1Kl　ideas，　nor　is㎝e　relation　sufficient　to　produce廿1is　d臼feCt．
But血t　we　may　understand　the　fUl1　force　of血iS　double　relation，　we　must
consider，　that　’tis　not　the　present　sensation　alone　or　momentary　pain　or
pleasure，　which　de㎞血es　the　character　of　any　passion，　but血e　whole　bent
or　tendency　of　it丘om　the　beginning　tO　the　end（T　381）．
There　is　always　a　tension　betWeen　explanation　and　justification　in　Hume．
The　relationship　between　explanation　and　justification　is　a　variation　of　the
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“is－ou帥t”probl㎝．　Hume’s血eory　of　belief　is　a血eory　for　explaining　the
belief　rather　than　a　theory　for　showing　which　among　the　competing　beliefs　is
justifiable．°s　Hume　focuses　on　the　elucidation　of　human　beliefs　because　even
the　jus廿fied　belief　must　agahl　be　a　1）elief　In　symPal血y，　it　is　mole　hnporね血t
to　explore　the　natural　mechanism　of　the　perception　of　sentiments，　whidl　by
its㎞plication　ca血serve　as　a　standard　ofjustification．
3．Sympathy　and　Communic副tion
　　Pride　and　humility　are　produced　through　the　transition　of　impressions
between　o切ect　and　su1オect；the　impression　that　is　entertained　regarding　the
o切ect，　is　transfbrred　into　an　impression　regarding　the　self　h　other　words，
ohj　ective　sentiments　become　su切ective　through　sympathy．　Impressions
themselves　belong　neither　to　the　su切ect　nor　to　the　o切ect．　In　this　way，
s）贋叩athy　provides　a　point　of　view　that　comprehends　pa而cular　perspectives．
Hume　says，
㎞sympa血y（）ur　own　person　is　not　the｛）bject　of　any　passion，　nor　is　there　any
仕血9，that　fixes　our　attention　・on　ourselves；as　in　the　present　case，　wheIe　we
are　supPos’d　tr）be　actuatedl　with　pdde　or　humi血ty．　OurseE　j血de脚dent　of
the　perception　of　every　other　objecち　is　in　reality　nothing：For　which　Ieason
we　must　tum　our　view　to　external　objects；and°tis　natUral　for　us　tO　consider
with　most　at㎞tion　such　as　lie　cont血gu（）us　to　us，　or　Iesemble　us（T　340－
341）．
It　is　obVious　that　Hume　thinks　that血e　pe聯tion　of　ourselves　c皿cially
dePendS　on　the　relation　with　object『am竜血d　which　we　are　placed．　He　says
that　the　change　of　the　ideas　into　impressions‘‘垂窒盾モ??р搭uom　cemin　views
飢dre且ections（T　317）．”Hume　insists山at止e飴llow㎞g　m継im　must　be
estat⊃lished」
That　’tis　not　the　present　sensation　or　momentary　pain　－or　pleasure，　whidl
det血es　the　character　of　any　passi（m，　but　the　general　bent　or　tcndency　of
it　ftm　the　beginnin9　to　the　end（T　384－385，　bold　let㎞n血e）．
Therefbre，　sympathy　is　a　development　of　the　sentiments　of　people　in
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general　and　reactions　fセom　one　sent㎞ent．　This　means　that　one　sentiment
and　situation　are　seen　not　from　a　single　perspective，　but　are　seen　and
considered　from　a　general　point　of　view．　In　this　sense，　sympathy　is　not
limited　to血e　present　seni㎞entS　and　situation，　and　can　extend　even　to　the
peQPle　who　are　not　present．
’Tisα紬腰sympathy　iS　not　alwayS　limited　tO　the　present　momeng　but
that　we　often　feel　by　comm曲adon出e　p曲s　and　pleasures　of　o血e岱，
whicll　are　not血being，　and　which　we　ollly　anticipate　by　the　fbrce　of
㎞ag血ad㎝σ385）．
　　This　expansion　of　the　idea　of　syn真pathy　suggests　the　expansion　of　hUman
relationships．　Sympathy　illtroduces　a　public　dimension　to　a　human
re蓋ationship　by　liberating　human　sentiments　from　the　direct　and　merely
personal　reaction　to　the　situation．　This　represents　the　generalisadon　of　the
point　of　view．　In　this　way，　particUlar　impressions’obtain　general　re◎ognition．
Thefefbre，　sympathy　consists　in　the　creation　of　a　general　pOint　of　view　that
takes血e　form　of　the　circUlation　of　custom　and　shared　op血ion　in　a　society．
　　Hume　confirms　the　relation－centred　character　of　passions．　Sentiments　of
other　people　are　transmitted　tllrough　relations　wllere　they　are　placed．
SymPa血1y　is　not　only　produced　through　relations；it　has　a　corollary　e丘bct　of
streng仕lening　relationships．　Sy卑pathy　is血e　basis　of　human　reladonship　by
enabling　communication　that　is　one　of　the　central　concepts　in　Hume’s
TreattSe」t　is　to　be　remembered　that　the　p血lary血nction　of　genera1　ideas　is
b蝕eoo㎜蒐血cation　pOssible．”　On　the　basis　of　communicatio馬　human
relations　and　society　are　established．　Because　of　physical　limitations，
individual　human　beings　can　have　direct　sentiments　only　of　themselves．
Wi伽ut　sy即athy，　other　peQple　appear　to　be　no　di脆rent丘om　mere　bodies
wi舳bi町movement．　Co㎜皿ication　that　is　based　on　symPathy　as　a
form　of　trans－subjectivity　enables　us　to　attain　mutual　understandng．　What　is
oo㎜mica面血ou帥s即p曲y　is　not欝面c励mere　se血㎞㎝的；on　the
幡is　of説dmen捻，　opinions　of　peqple　also　be◎ome　co㎜面cable．
　　SymPathy　also　serves　as　a　fbundation　of　our　beliefs．　This　is伽e　of　our　all
beliefs　includng　what　is　called　strict　sciences．　Science　cannot　be　established
wi電血out　takh19血to　a　ount血e　sentimentS　of　other　people．　SupPose　you　are
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apolitical　scientist，　how　can　you　analyse　tlle　political　situation　without
rel）壇ng　on　data，　whose　bu止parts　are　composed　of　other　people’s　opinion？
Similarly，　in　all　humall　endeavours，　one，s　intellectual　apPreciation　is
fbunded　upon　the　sentiment　of　sympathy．　If　you　are　llistorian，　can　you
Witness　in　person　any　event　that　occurred　before　you　were　born？If　someone
maintains　that　only　tmth　matters，　why　is　it　that　tbis　tmth　matters　fbr　him
rather　than　that　truth？Or　is　there　any　one　absolute　tluth　that　covers
everything？Why，　then，　are　there　mally　activities，　or‘‘6verytlling，”rather
than　just　one？This　is　possible　b㏄ause　we　naturally　receive　the　sent㎞㎝ts
of　other　people　in　their　original　fbrm．　To　deny　the　Humean　notion　of
sympathy　is　to　deny　a負mdamental　condition　fbr　science．　Therefbre，　fbr
Hume，　symPathy　provides　essential　materials　for　sciences．　Hume　criticises
the　theories　that　allege　reason　to　be　the廿source，　because　they　pretend　that
they　can　do　without　sympathy，　though　they　derive　their　opinioll
s㎜・eptitiously　f』om　sy坦pathy．30
　　The　other負mdamental　f㎞ction　of　the　Humean　sympathy　is　to　cause
partiality，　not　impartiality，　of　sent㎞entS㎞individuals．　Pa而ality　means　to
take　care　of　a　particUlar　need．　Hume’s　morality　is　based　on　partiality　as　there
is　no　impression　that　corresponds　to　impartiality．　Everything　owes　it3
existence　to　some　partiality，　and　every　sentiment　is　pa】面al　including　the
moral　sentiments．31　Where　there　is　a　partiality　or　a血imbalance　of　sentiments，
nature　tends　to　work　to　put　them　right．32　As　long　as　humall　life　continues，
there　will　always　be　some　imbalance　that　requires　adjustment．
　　Partiality　inevitably　accompanies　imbalance　as　its　by－produce，　which
needS　to　be　dealt　with．33　H㎜e血s血at　human　behaviour　is　motivated　by
that　i血balance，　rather　thall　by　impartial　ideal　that　has　no　root　in　reality．　It　is
to　be　remembered　that　the　general　point　of　view　occupied　originally　as　a
me曲coπ㏄t血g　o曲ed　percepdons．　The　most　human　be血gs　can　do
fbr　themselves　is　to　try　to　meet　this　requirement．　Parents　attend　tlleir
children，　and　wod【ers　listen　to　their　colleagues，　to　name　just　two　examples．
All　we　do　is　to　address　the　imbalance　issued　by　sentiments　of　our血iends，
㎞ily，　nei帥bo㎜，鋤d　o血ers，輌舳e　pmvision　ofj耐ice血civil　society．sc
It　is　impossible　to　act　for　those　panicular　distant　people　whom　we　do　not
have　sy鵬pa血y　for．　Also，　people　ale　justified　in　takillg　charge　only　of　their
‘‘垂窒盾?奄高奄狽凵C’，　b㏄ause　66distant”　people　have　thel匡own　neighbours．　In　this
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way，　all　are　placed皿de曲e㎜伽1　care　of　each　o血er．
Therefore，　it　is　a　mis敏e　to血ink　that血e　motiva廿on舳uman・ac翻es
consists　hl　utility，　or　in　any　dogmatic　ideal，　religious　or　ideologica1．　It　is　also
groundless　to　suppose　that　some　unseen　providence　Wi11　a耐omatically　work
to　produce　the　best　result　out　of　the　imbalance．　On　the　basis　of　the
a（加stment，　the　redistribution　of　property　can　t包ke　place，　and　market　can
fimction　properly．35　The　real　authority　of　ophゴon　consists㎞this　fUnction　as
wel1；op血1ions　do　not　indicate　the　moral　law　or　the　standard　of　morality，　but
represent　people’s　sentiments．361n　all　of　these，　Humean　sy田pathy　signifies　a
vehicle　that　lets　the　excess　or　deficit　of　passions　proceed　its　way　into
equiliblri㎜．
　　Ultimately，　there　is　llo　other　ground　but　sy卑pathy　with　others　that　one
engages　in　social　activities．37　Precisely　because　of　this，　to　deceive　others　by
pretendillg　false　emotions　or　opinions　fbr　selfLinterest　is　a　vice．　In　the
負mdamental　manner，　trust　is　the　fundamelltal　prillciple　of　human
relationships．　People　are　not　responsible　to　believe　the　false　emotions　or
opinions　of　others　and　to　act　on　them，　because山e　system　of　human　natUre
binds　everyone．　We　cannot　decide　whether　or　not　to　sympathise　with
another°s　opinion　in　the血゜st　instance；symPathy　occurs　prior　to　judgement．zz
Wi舳e　assumption　of　sympa止y　as　a　natUral　hum叫henomenon，　lying　is
treason　against　human　natUre．　Thus，　Hume，s　theory　of　sympathy　is　very
fUndamenta1　to　his　theory　of　morals；Without　the　working　of　sympathy，　the
systam　of　human　interaction　can　hardly　be　sus面ned．39
4．Concluding　Remarks　　　　　　　　、
The　central　significance　of　Hume’s　theory　of　passion　is　to　explain血e
social　recognition　of　physical　obj　ects　and　human　actions．　We　have　seen山at
because　of　the　transference　of　passions，　physical　o句㏄ts　come　to　assume　a
social　significance．　Human　relationships　are　orgallised　pivoting　on　the
property　relationship．　As　call　be　seen　ill　Hume’s　theory　of　justice，　human
be血gs　are　given　social　recognition　as　a　property　owner．oo　Therefore，　human
relationships　are　a　re血ection　of　property　relationships。　Hume°s　theory　of
passions　is丘rst　of　all　a　theory　for　explaining　this　mechanism．
　　Sympathy　is　a　special　case　of　the　transference　of’passions　that　have　the
sentiments　of　other　people　as　their　original　objects．　Tlle　most　significant
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㎞c廿on　of　s）鵬pathy　is　the　recognidon　of　the　sent㎞ents　of　other　people．
The　morality　of　a　person　is　determined　by　the　effects　of　his　own　action．　In
terms　of　perceptions，　both　property　and　action　are　qualities　that　produce
some　pleasant　or　painfU1　sentiments　in　others．血i　accordahce　with　the　effects
of　one°s　actions，　one　is　accorded　with　moral　recognition　by　othbr　people．
Therefore，　sympathy　enables　us　to　have　a　recognition　of　the　moral　quality　of
other　people．
　　Evaluation　of　actions　and　possessions　are　inco甲o！ated　into血e　human
world　through　sympathy．　Sympathy　provides　necessary　perceptions　that
produce　a　v蜘of　human　co㎜皿ication　on　the　basis　of　which　moml
llorms　and　illstitutions　are　created．　It　has　become　clear　that　sympathy
indicates　the　direction　of　human　sentiments　that　create　stability　among
human　relationship，　thus　Hume’s　theory　of　sympathy　replaces　the　non－
hulnan　concept　of　providence．41
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